Microsoft forces AI on developers

Microsoft, in a recent update to its Visual Studio IDE, has forced Copilot AI onto developers. It's not an obvious change, in fact, it affects a rarely-used corner of the IDE: the profiler.

A profiler is a useful if not often used tool. Most of the time a programmer is editing the code. Somewhat less time is spent compiling and linking the source code into executable files. Depending on the developer and the quality of the code (which may have been written by others) some amount of time is spent debugging the code - running the code in 'slow motion' and observing which lines are executed and which are not.

The profiler is a tool to measure the code, specifically as it runs. Different profilers (or different parts of a large profiler) measure the time to execute functions (to identify which functions are slow), the amount of memory used, file operations, and "code coverage" (to identify code that is not tested).

Microsoft's Visual Studio has a profiler built as one of its tools. (And it's a nice, capable profiler.)

But Microsoft's latest version of Visual Studio adds Copilot to the profiler, and adds it in such a way that you cannot use the profiler without using Copilot. (You don't seem to have to pay for this specific use of Copilot, though.)

It so happens that a client has decided to disable Copilot in their organization. (Exactly how is not important.) They have their reasons to do so, and while I may not agree with their reasons I do agree with their goal of disabling Copilot. (I think Copilot and the other programming AIs are not quite ready for prime time.)

Working in this environment it is obvious that the new version of Visual Studio is dependent on Copilot: the profiler refuses to run. (It's not quite obvious; it took a few seasoned hands to identify the connection.)

A few observations about this change:

First, Microsoft, rather than allowing developers to enable Copilot, is forcing Copilot upon them. That's not going to win them many friends. Selling a new feature ("See this new feature! It's shiny!") tends to keep people on your team. Forcing a change makes people angry -- possibly angry enough to leave your team.

Second, Microsoft has built a new profiler that requires Copilot and cannot work without it. This is a poor design choice. Good design of systems allows components to work even when parts of them are not available. (And as the profiler worked just fine without Copilot two weeks ago, I don't see how Copilot is such a necessary part of the profiler.)

Third, if Microsoft is willing to force Copilot onto developers for the profiling tool, they may be planning to force Copilot onto developers for other parts of Visual Studio. Auto-completion, for example. Or syntax coloring. Or debugging. Or maybe even code optimization by the compiler. I'm not sure Copilot is ready for such tasks.

Fourth, if Microsoft is willing to force Copilot onto developers, they may be planning to force Copilot onto other users -- in Microsoft tools such a as Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Access, and maybe even things like Maps. (I'm not talking about making Copilot available to these tools; I'm suggesting that Microsoft make Copilot mandatory in these tools.)

The bundling of Copilot into the Visual Studio profiler is a small change for a small audience. I don't see people in significant numbers moving away from Microsoft because of it. A few might, but nothing significant.

But it doesn't increase the appeal of Visual Studio. Developers like control over their tools. I don't see people joining Microsoft's team because they are forced to use Copilot.

One could interpret this change (for Visual Studio) as an experiment: Will users work with Copilot? Or as an act of desperation: We need to get higher usage numbers for Copilot. In either case, it's an internal issue. Microsoft is not boosting its appeal to developers, and not setting a higher standard for its competitors to meet. As an internal issue, the rating of success (or failure) will be determined by internal numbers. I don't expect we'll see more about this change.

Microsoft doesn't know how customers want to use AI

Microsoft has pushed its "Copilot" AI in a lot of places. It's in Windows. It's in Office (excuse me, "Microsoft 365") applications. It's in Visual Studio Code, Visual Studio, and GitHub. If Microsoft has a property, Microsoft has injected Copilot into it.

Little of this (if any) has gone over well with customers. Combined with the injection of advertising, the push of AI has created so much dissatisfaction that customers are leaving Windows for Mac or (gasp) Linux.

A lot has been written (or recorded and posted on YouTube) about this. I won't rehash the arguments here.

What I will ask is this: Why is Microsoft doing this? Why is Microsoft putting Copilot into its products and services willy-nilly, much like it did with the ".NET" label for product names.

I have an idea:

Microsoft doesn't know how customers will use AI, or what they want to do with it.

This is a change for Microsoft. For much of its life, Microsoft has played "catch-up" with technology. After its lead with BASIC, and its fortunate contract with IBM for PC-DOS, Microsoft has been following others. It followed Apple's MacIntosh computers with Windows. It followed a number of database providers with SQL Server. It followed NetScape with Internet Explorer. It followed Java with C#. It followed the iPod with the Zune (look it up). It followed Amazon AWS with Azure.

Now Microsoft is following other AI providers with its Copilot. But those other AI providers are different from Apple and NetScape and Sun Microsystems (the makers of Java). They all knew what their customers wanted, and they provided a solution that met those wants.

Today's providers of AI don't know what their customers want. They don't know how to make a profit from AI. But they are popular and Microsoft is following them, which means that Microsoft doesn't know when their customers want from AI and Microsoft doesn't know how to make a profit from AI.

I find all of this rather unsettling.

 

Microsoft stumbles

Microsoft's attempt to sell AI has been going ... less than spectacularly. It seems that few people want to buy it.

This stumble by Microsoft is a good time to look back at how it has succeeded, and how it has failed, in the past. Microsoft has had a number of successes: BASIC, MS-DOS, Windows, Internet Explorer, Visual Visual Basic, Visual Studio and C#, and Azure. It has also had failures: "Bob" the friendly desktop, "Clippy" the original "AI" assistant, Visual C++, the Zune music player, Windows Phone (both hardware and software), 

Much of Microsoft's success has been built not on technical innovation or product quality. Instead, it was built on marketing and legal agreements.

The first success: BASIC

Microsoft's BASIC was ROM-able; it could be packaged in a ROM and sold as part of a complete PC. That made it attractive to PC manufacturers. A few early PCs used their own versions of BASIC in ROM, but Microsoft's was the most capable. (In this case, Microsoft did have the best product.) Microsoft BASIC became the standard (literally, too; it was adopted by ANSI) and everyone wanted. It was a success driven by the market but also by licensing agreements.

When a manufacturer didn't buy Microsoft's BASIC -- such as Apple -- Microsoft made a plug-in card complete with Z-80 processor and basic interpreter in ROM.

The second success: MS-DOS

Microsoft made a contract with IBM to sell it an operating system, and retained the right to sell that operating system to others. When the IBM PC was released, it immediately became popular as did PC-DOS. (IBM also offered CP/M-86 and USCD p-System for the PC, but higher prices discouraged their adoption.)

The success of the IBM PC, and the success of other computers running MS-DOS (early ones not compatible with the PC, later ones compatible) gave Microsoft a revenue stream and a unique place in the market. Microsoft started setting standards for device drivers and technology to access more that the PC's 1MB memory range.

This success was due to the licensing agreement with IBM, and later licensing agreements with PC manufacturers. Microsoft negotiated a fee for each PC manufactured, regardless of its operating system. Thus, manufacturers had an incentive to include MS-DOS with the hardware.

The third success: Windows

Microsoft gained power with Windows. Microsoft Office, and its superior performance due to API calls not available to competitors. The 'tar baby' effect, in which one Windows product (Outlook) required another Windows product (Exchange). (Or a number of products each requiring SQL Server.)

The fourth success: Internet Explorer

It became popular and the corporate standard. Many web sites advertised "best viewed in IE" and some web sites failed on other browsers.

But since then, Microsoft has had precious few successes. Its notable wins are Azure (capable but still competing with AWS and Google cloud services) and the Surface tablet (premium hardware that shows what is possible and keeps the Windows ecosystem alive). IE's success was relatively short-lived. Google's Chrome rose partly as a revolt against Microsoft. Now Chrome runs the web, IE is gone, and even Edge has Chrome inside.

Microsoft has not designed a successful product (one that became dominant) in the past two decades.

Now Microsoft is pushing AI, specifically "agentic AI". And by "pushing" I don't mean "hawking" but "stuffing down user's throats". Windows 11 is getting agentic AI functions whether you want them or not.

Microsoft's early successes gave them a lot of power in the market. With that power apparently came arrogance, not just a sense of "Microsoft knows best" but "you're going to take this new tech whether you want it or not". Which is just what Microsoft is doing with AI and Windows 11.

But now there are reports of people switching from Windows to Apple (or Linux) to avoid the coming AI. This indicates that Microsoft's market position is not as strong as it was, and that people (when pushed) will choose alternatives. Apple is a reasonable alternative, and even Linux and open source software is capable enough for many office and home functions.

If Microsoft wants to succeed, they must become humble and stop pushing tech onto people. They must shift their mindset from "we know best" to "we've got products that people want". Right now, they don't have products (at least with AI) that people want.

All the Windows 10 PCs

Microsoft's Windows 11 is not compatible with much of the existing PCs in the world. Microsoft gave no reasons for such incompatibility, but we can deduce that by specifying a certain level of hardware (processor and memory, mostly) Microsoft was able to implement certain features for security.

Regardless of the reason, a lot of PCs could not move to Windows 11, and therefore stayed on Windows 10. Soon, support for Windows 10 will stop, and those PCs will not get updates -- not even security updates. (Microsoft does offer extended support for a small fee.)

What's going to happen to all of those Windows 10 PCs? Microsoft recommends that you upgrade to Windows 11, and if that is not possible, replace (or recycle) your PC. Here's what I think will happen.

A large number of Windows 10 PCs (perhaps the majority) will stay on Windows 10. People will continue to use the PC, with Windows 10, to do their normal tasks. They won't get security updates, and that they will be okay with that.

Some number of Windows 10 PCs will be replaced. I suspect that this number (as a percentage of Windows PCs) is small. The people who want Windows 11 already have it. A few people may be waiting for the "right time" to upgrade to Windows 11, so they will replace their PCs.

Some number of Windows 10 PCs will be converted to Linux. This may be a smaller percentage than either of the "stay on Windows 10" or "replace" crowds.

I should point out that many PCs that are replaced are then sold to people who resell them. Some will physically destroy the PC, but others simply reformat the disk (or replace the disk) and resell the PC, either with Windows or with Linux. Thus, a PC that is "replaced" can continue its life as a Linux PC.

All in all, the decision by Microsoft to make some PCs obsolete (sort of) will lead to an increase in the number of PCs running Linux.

For me, this decision is personal. I have an old-ish HP laptop which runs Windows 10. It won't run Windows 11 -- even with Microsoft loosening the requirements for Windows 11. I have a decision: keep Windows 10, or switch to Linux. (I like the laptop and want to keep using it.)

Keeping Windows 10 is easy, but offers little benefit. I use Windows for few tasks (most of my work is in Linux) and there are only two items that require Windows: remote access to the office, and administering some old Apple Time Capsules and Airports.

My other option is to convert it to Linux. Conversion is also easy -- I've installed Linux on a number of other PCs. Once converted, I may need to use WINE to run the Apple Airport administration program. (Or I may simply replace the Apple Time Capsules and Airports with modern file servers and routers.) Access to the office isn't that important. The office supplies me with an official PC for access; my personal Windows PC is a back-up method when the official PC fails. (Which it has not done for as long as I can remember.)

So I think I will take up Microsoft's suggestion to get off of Windows 10. But it won't be to go to Windows 11. I have another PC running Windows 11; I don't need two.

Apple is ready for AI

I have been critical of Apple, and more specifically its designs with the M-series processors. My complaint is that the processors are too powerful, that even the simplest M1 processor is more than capable of handling tasks of an average user. (That is, someone who browses the web, reads and sends e-mail, and pays bills.)

The arrival of "AI" has changed my opinion. The engines that we call "artificial intelligence" require a great deal of processing, memory, and storage, which is just what the M-series processors have. Apple is ready to deploy AI on its next round of computers, powered by M4 processors. Those processors, merely speculative today, will most likely arrive in 2025 with companion hardware and software that includes AI-driven features.

Apple is well positioned for this. Their philosophy is to run everything locally. Applications run on the Mac, not in the cloud. Apps run on iPhones and iPads, not in the cloud. Apple can sell the benefits of AI combined with the benefits of privacy, as nothing travels across the internet.

This is different from the Windows world, which has seen applications and apps rely on resources in the cloud. Microsoft Office has been morphing, slowly into cloud-based applications. (There is a version one can install on a local PC, but I suspect that parts of that use cloud-based resources.)

I'm not sure how Microsoft and other application vendors will respond. Will they shift back to local processing? (Such a move would require a significant increase in processing power on the PC.) Will they continue to move to the cloud? (That will probably require additional security, and marketing, to convince users that their data is safe.)

Microsoft's response may be driven by the marketing offered by Apple. If Apple stresses privacy, Microsoft will (probably) counter with security for cloud-based applications. If Apple stresses performance, Microsoft may counter with cloud-based data centers and distributed processing.

In any case, it will be interesting to see the strategies that both companies use.

Will Microsoft Change Windows to Linux

People, from time to time, ask about Microsoft changing from Windows to Linux. When they do, lots of people respond. The responses fall into two general categories: Microsoft will switch to Linux because it is the superior operating system, and Microsoft will stick with Windows because it is the superior operating system.

The rebuttals are always -- always -- in the technical realm. Linux is better at this, and Windows is better at that.

I have a different response.

Microsoft will switch from Windows to Linux if, and when, it is Microsoft's interest to switch.

In the 1990s and 2000s, Windows was a key part of its strategy. Microsoft sold software (or licenses for software, which amounts to the same thing) and it used Windows as a base for its other products. Office ran on Windows (and versions for Mac OS, which were a special case). SQL Server ran on Windows. Internet Explorer ran on Windows. Outlook ran on Windows, and talked to Exchange, which also ran on Windows. Visual Studio ran on Windows. SourceSafe ran on Windows (and Unix, because it had been developed by an independent company and sold to Microsoft).

During that period, Microsoft would never consider switching from Windows to Linux. Such a move would destroy Microsoft's strategy of "everything on Windows".

Today, Microsoft offers services that extend beyond Windows, and some of them use Linux. Azure provides cloud services. One can provision Linux servers as well as Windows servers (and pay Microsoft for both). Microsoft has less incentive to force customers to use Windows.

In addition, Microsoft is moving its apps into the cloud and onto the web. One can open and edit Word documents and Excel spreadsheets in a browser. (The online versions of Word and Excel are limited compared to the locally-installed versions. I expect the online versions to improve over time.) Microsoft has also created a cloud-based, web version of Visual Studio Code, which lets programmers collaborate across multiple operating systems.

Microsoft has dropped the "everything on Windows" strategy in favor of a "sell services and subscriptions" strategy. It doesn't require Windows to be at the center of the customer experience.

Will Microsoft replace Windows with Linux? The proper way to look at the question is not in the technical realm, but in the financial realm. If Microsoft can make more money with Linux than Windows, it should (and probably will) offer Linux.

Windows provides an income stream, in the form of licenses. Microsoft is moving from a "buy once until you upgrade" approach to an annual subscription. The latter is more predictable, for both Microsoft and customers, and seems to provide higher revenue to Microsoft. But the point is that Windows provides income to Microsoft.

Windows is also an expense for Microsoft. The development, maintenance, and support for Windows requires time and effort in significant quantities.

The question then becomes: which is the higher number? Does revenue cover expenses (and then some)? Or does Windows cost more to maintain than it brings in revenue?

The current capabilities of Microsoft's cloud-based web applications are such that locally-installed applications provide more to the customer. Some day that may change. Until it does, those advantages translate to incentives to support Windows.

Technical arguments can be fun. They can also be heated. But they are not the way to convince Microsoft to switch to Linux. Or to stay with Windows. The decision is a financial one, not a technical one.

Moving fast and going far are not the same thing

There is an old saying: If you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go in a group.

One significant difference between Apple and Microsoft is that Apple manages product lines and Microsoft manages an ecosystem. This difference is significant. Apple is, essentially, moving alone. It can (now) design its own hardware and software. Apple does still need raw materials, fabrication for its chips, manufacture of its cases and boxes, and assembly of components into finished goods. But Apple deals with two types of entities: suppliers (the companies that supply raw materials, chips, etc.) and customers (the people and companies that purchase computers and services).

Microsoft, in contrast, lives in an ecosystem that includes suppliers, PC manufacturers, developers, and customers (both individual and organizational). While Microsoft does design its Surface tablets and laptops, those tablets and laptops are a small part of the larger market. The laptops and desktops made by Dell, Lenovo, HP, and others are a large portion of the market.

Apple can move quickly, changing its processors from Intel to Apple-designed ARM in less than two years. Microsoft, on the other hand, must move more cautiously. It cannot dictate that Windows will shift from Intel to ARM because Microsoft does not control the manufacturers of PCs.

If Microsoft wants to shift personal computers from the current designs of discrete components to system-on-chip designs (and I believe that they do) then Microsoft must persuade the rest of the ecosystem to move in that direction. Such persuasion is not easy -- PC makers have lots invested in the current designs, and are familiar with gradual changes to improve PCs. For the past three decades, Microsoft has guided PC design through specifications that allow PCs to run Windows, and those specification have changed gradually: faster processors here, faster buss connections there, faster memory at some times, better interfaces to graphics displays at other times. The evolution of personal computers has been a slow, predictable process, with changes that can be absorbed into the manufacturing processes of the PC makers.

The Microsoft "empire" of PC design has been, for all intents and purposes, successful. For thirty years we have benefitted from computers in the office and in the home, and those computers have (for the most part) been usable and reliable.

Apple benefitted from that PC design too. The Intel-based Mac and MacBook computers were designed in the gravity field of Windows. Those Mac computers were Windows PCs, capable of running Windows (and Linux) because they used the same processors, video chips, and buss interfaces as Windows PCs. They had to use those chips; custom chips would be too expensive and risky to make.

Apple has now left that empire. It is free of the "center of gravity" that Windows provides in the market. Apple can now design its own processor, its own video chips, its own memory, its own storage. Apple is free! Free to move in any direction it likes, free to design any computer it wants.

I predict that Apple computers will move in their own direction, away from the standard design for Windows PCs. Each new generation of Apple computers will be less and less "Windows compatible". It will be harder and harder to run Windows (or Linux) on Apple hardware.

Microsoft has a new challenge now. They must answer Apple's latest M1 (and M2) system-on-chip designs. But they cannot upend the ecosystem. Nor can they abandon Intel and shift everything to ARM designs. Apple has leveraged its experience with its 'A' series chips in phones to build the 'M' series chips for computers. Microsoft doesn't have that experience, but it has something Apple doesn't: an ecosystem.

I predict that Microsoft will form alliances with other companies to build system-on-chip designs. Probably with IBM, to leverage virtual machine technology (and patents) and possibly Intel to leverage chip fabrication. (Intel recently announced that it was open to sharing its fabrication plants for non-Intel designs.)

[I hold stock in both Microsoft and IBM. That probably biases my view.]

Microsoft needs to build experience with system-on-chip designs, and alliances can provide that experience. But alliances require time, so I'm not expecting an announcement from Microsoft right away. The first system-on-chip designs may be tablets and simple laptops, possibly competing with Chromebooks. Those first simple laptops may take two years of negotiation, experimentation, design, assembly, and testing before anything is ready for market. (And even then, they may have a few problems.)

I think Microsoft can achieve the goal of system-on-chip designs. I think that they will do it with the combined effort of multiple companies. I think it will take time, and the very first products may be disappointing. But in the long run, I think Microsoft can succeed.

If you want to move fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go in a group.

Everyone who is not Apple

Apple has direct control over the design of their hardware and software, a situation that has not been seen in the history of personal computers. I expect that they will enjoy success -- at least for a while -- with new, powerful designs.

But what about everyone else? What about Microsoft, the maker of Windows, Office, Azure services, Surface tablets and laptops, and other things? What about Dell and Lenovo and Toshiba and HP, the makers of personal computers? What Google, the maker of Chromebooks and cloud services?

That's a big question, and it has a number of answers.

Microsoft has a number of paths forward, and will probably pursue several of them. For its Surface devices, it can design systems on a chip that correspond to Apple's M1 chips. Microsoft could use ARM CPUs; it has already ported Windows to ARM and offers the "Surface X" with ARM. Microsoft could design a system-on-a-chip that uses Intel CPUs; such would provide binary compatibility with current Windows applications. Intel chips generate more heat, but Microsoft has success with Intel chips in most of its Surface line, so a system-on-a-chip with Intel could be possible. These paths mirror the path that Apple has taken.

Microsoft, unlike Apple, has another possible way forward: cloud services. Microsoft could design efficient processors for the computers that run data centers, the computers that host virtual instances of Windows and Linux. Such a move would ease the shift of processing from laptops and desktop computers and the cloud. (Such a shift is possible today; system-on-chip designs make it more efficient.) Microsoft may work with Intel, or AMD, or even IBM to design and build efficient hardware for cloud data centers.

Manufacturers of personal computers may design their own system-on-chip answers to the M1 processor. Or they may form a consortium and design a common chip that can be used by all (still allowing for custom system-on-chip designs and the current discrete component designs). Microsoft has, for a long time, provided a reference document for the requirements of Windows, and system-on-chip designs would follow that set of requirements just as laptops and desktops today follow those requirements.

PC manufacturers do lose some control when they adopt a common design. A common design would be common, and available to all manufacturers. It prevents a manufacturer from enhancing the design by selecting better components. Rather than shift their entire product line to system-on-chip design, manufacturers will probably use the system-on-chip design for only some of the offerings, keeping some products with discrete designs (and enhancements to distinguish them from the competition).

Google does not have to follow the requirements for Windows; it has its own requirements for Chromebooks. System-on-chip design is a good fit for Chromebooks, which already use both Intel and ARM chips (and few users can see the difference). The performance improvement of system-on-chip design fits in nicely with Google's plan for games on Chromebooks. The increase in power allows for an increase in the sophistication of web-based apps.

I am willing to wait for Microsoft's response and for Google's response. I think we will see innovative designs and improvements to the computing experience. I expect Microsoft to push in two directions: system-on-chip designs for their Surface tablets, and cloud-based applications running on enhanced hardware. Google will follow a similar strategy, enhancing cloud hardware and improving the capabilities of Chromebooks.

System-on-chips for everyone!

Apple has demonstrated that the system-on-chip design (seen in their new MacBooks, iMacs, and Mac Minis) is popular.

What does system-on-chip design mean for other forms of computing? Will other manufacturers adopt that design?

An obvious market for system-on-chip design is Chromebooks. (If they are not using it already.) Many Chromebooks already use ARM processors (others use Intel) and moving the ARM-based Chromebooks to ARM-based system-on-chip design is fairly straightforward. Chromebooks also have a narrow design specification, controlled by Google, which makes a system-on-chip design feasible. Google limits the variation of Chromebooks, so it may be that the entire Chromebook market could be served with three (or possibly four) distinct designs.

Chromebooks would benefit from system-on-chip designs in two ways: lower cost and higher performance. One may think performance is unimportant to Chromebooks because Chromebooks are merely hosts for the Chrome browser, but that is not true. The Chrome browser (indeed, any modern browser) must do a lot, from rendering HTML to running JavaScript to playing audio and video. They must also handle keystrokes and focus, tasks normally associated with an operating systems's window manager. In addition, browsers must now execute web-assembly (WASM) for some applications. Browsers are complex critters.

Google also has their eyes on games, and improved performance will allow more Chromebooks to run advanced games.

I think we can safely assume that Chromebooks will move to system-on-chip designs.

What about Windows PCs? Will they change to system-on-chip designs? Here I think the answer is not so obvious.

Microsoft sets hardware specifications for Windows. If you want to build a PC that runs Windows, you have to conform to those specifications. It is quite possible that Microsoft will design their own system-on-chip for PCs and use them in Microsoft's own Surface tablets and laptops. It is possible that they will make the design available to other manufacturers (Dell, Lenovo, etc.). Such a move would make it easier to build PCs that conform to Microsoft's specifications.

A system-on-chip design would possibly split designs for PCs into two groups: system-on-chip in one group and traditional discrete components in the other. System-on-chip designs work poorly with expansion slots, so PCs that use such a design would probably have no expansion slots -- not even one for a GPU. But many folks want GPUs, so they will prefer traditional designs. We may see a split market for Windows PCs, with customizable PCs using discrete components and non-upgradable PCs (similar to Chromebooks and Macbooks) using system-on-chip designs.

Such a split has already occurred in the Windows PC market. Laptop PCs tend to have limited options for upgrades (if any). Small desktop PCs also have limited options. Large desktops are the computers that still have expansion slots; these are the computers that let the owner replace components such as RAM and storage.

I think system-on-chip designs are the way of the future for most of our computers (laptops, desktops, phones, etc.). I think we'll see better performance, lower cost, and improved reliability. It's a move in a good direction.

Linux is a parasite, and it may be our future

Linux is a parasite.

So is Unix.

The first Unix ran on a DEC PDP-7. But DEC did not sell PDP-7s to run Unix; it sold them to run its own operating system called "DECsys".

Later Unix versions ran on PDP-11s. But DEC did not sell PDP-11s to run Unix; it sold them to run later operating systems called RSX-11, TSX-11, CTS-11, and RSTS.

DEC's minicomputers were simple, compared to today's PCs. They would load and run just about any program. On many models, the loader program (what we would call the bootstrap code) was entered by hand on a front panel.

There was no trusted platform, no TPM, no signed code. It was easy to load Unix onto a DEC minicomputer. The success of Unix was due, in part, to the openness of those minicomputers.

But to be honest, Unix was a parasite. It took advantage of the hardware that was available.

Linux is in the same way a parasite on PCs. PCs are sold to run Windows. (Yes, a few are sold with Linux. But PCs are designed to run Windows, and the cast majority are sold with Windows.)

PC hardware has been, from the original IBM PC, open and well-documented. Linux took advantage of that openness, and has enjoyed a modicum of success.

Linux is a parasite on Apple PCs too, taking advantage of the hardware that Apple designed.

But the life of a parasite is not easy.

As Apple changes its hardware and bolsters security, it becomes harder to run Linux on an Apple PC. It is possible to run Linux on an M1 MacBook. I expect that the effort will increase over the next few years, as Apple introduces more changes to defend against malware.

Microsoft is making similar changes to Windows and the PC platform. Microsoft designs and builds a small number of PCs, and issues a specification for the hardware to run Windows. That specification is changing to defend against malware. Those changes also make it harder to install Linux.

Will we see a day when it is impossible to install Linux on a PC? Or on a Macbook? I think we will, probably with Apple equipment first. Devices such as the iPhone and Apple Time Capsule require signed code to boot an operating system, and Apple is not divulging the signing keys. It is not possible to install Linux on them. I think a similar fate awaits Apple's Macbooks and iMac lines. Once that happens, Linux will be locked out of Apple hardware.

Chromebooks look for code signed by Google, although in developer mode they can boot code that has been signed by others. (The Chromebook boot code looks for a signed kernel, but it doesn't care who signed it.)

Microsoft is moving towards signed code. Windows version 11 will require signed code and a TPM (Trusted Platform Module) in the PC. There are ways to load Linux on these PCs, so Linux has not yet been locked out.

I think Microsoft recognizes the contributions that Linux makes to the ecosystem, and is taking steps to ensure that Linux will be available on future PCs. Apple, I think, sees no benefit from Linux and is willing to lock Linux out of Apple devices. Microsoft sees value in letting Linux run on PCs; Apple doesn't.

It might be that Microsoft is preparing a radical change. It may be that Microsoft is getting ready to limit Windows to virtual systems, and drop support for "real" PCs. The new "Windows 365" product (virtual computers running Windows accessible from a browser) could be the future of Windows.

In this fantasy world I am constructing, Microsoft provides Windows on virtual hardware and not anywhere else. Access to Windows is available via browser, but one must acquire the hardware and operating system to run the browser. That could be an old PC running an old (in the future) version of Windows 10 or Windows 11, or it could mean a Chromebook running ChromeOS, or it could mean a desktop PC running Linux.

This would be a big change -- and I'm not saying that it will happen, only that it may happen -- and it would have profound affects on the IT world. There are some thoughts that come to mind:

First, performance becomes less important for the physical PC running the browser. The heavy CPU work is on the server side. The PC hosting the browser is a fancy terminal, displaying the results of the computation but not performing the computation. The race for speed shifts to the servers hosting the virtual instances of Windows. (And there is less pressure to update local PCs every three years.)

Second, the effort to develop and support Windows drops significantly. A lot of work for Microsoft is maintaining compatibility with hardware. Windows works with just about every piece of hardware going back decades: printers, video cards, disk drives, camera, phones, ... you name it, Windows supports it. If Microsoft shifts to a virtual-server-only version of Windows, a lot of that work disappears from Microsoft's queue. The work doesn't vanish; it shifts to the people building the non-virtual PCs that run the browsers. But the work (and the expense) does vanish from Microsoft's accounts.

Third, this change is one that Apple cannot follow. Apple has built its strategy of privacy on top of a system of local processing -- a secure box. They don't send data to remote servers -- doing so would let your personal data escape the secure box. It has no way to offer virtual instances of macOS that correspond to Windows 365 without breaking that secure box. (And just as Windows 365 allows for longer lifespans of local PCs, virtual macOS would allow for longer lifespans of Macs and Macbooks -- something that Apple would prefer not to see, as they rely on consumers replacing their equipment every so often.)

If Microsoft does make this change, the prospects for Linux improve. If Microsoft pulls Windows off of the market, then PC manufacturers must offer something to run on their hardware. That something cannot be macOS, and it certainly won't be FreeDOS. (As good as it is, FreeDOS is not what we need.)

The operating system that comes with PCs may be Linux, or a variant of Linux built for laptop makers. There could be two versions: a lightweight version that is close to ChromeOS (just enough to run a browser) and a heavier version that is close to today's Linux distros.

If Microsoft makes this change -- and again, I'm not sure that they will -- then we really could see "the year of the Linux desktop". Oh, and it would mean that Linux would no longer be a parasite.

Windows 11 is change, which is not new

Microsoft announced Windows 11, and with it a set of requirements for the hardware that is required to run Windows 11. This is not new; all versions of Windows have had a list of "minimum required hardware". Yet some folks are quite upset about the requirements. Why are they so upset?

Looking back over the history of PCs (and going back the the first IBM PC, before the days of Windows), we can see a steady pattern of improvements to hardware and operating systems that took advantage of those improvements. New versions often required better hardware.

The first IBM PCs came without hard disks, and floppy disks were an option. DOS, the PC operating system before Windows, required floppy disks. IBM's PC XT included a hard disk, and DOS version 2 took advantage of the hard disk. (And was required to use the hard disk.) One could run DOS 2 on a floppy-only PC -- if you had enough memory -- but it provided little advantage. Systems with insufficient memory were not supported.

Windows 3.0, the first version of Windows to achieve popularity, would run on a PC with an 8088 processor, but it required a hard drive, and the multimedia operations required an 80286 processor and a CD drive. Here we see that older, less capable systems, are not supported.

Windows NT and each of its successors have set requirements for processor, memory, graphics, and disk space. Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 8, and Windows 10 all have requirements for hardware.

So we should be used to the idea that new operating systems will not support older systems.

But I keep coming back to the question: why are people so upset about this version of Windows? What is it with Windows 11 that makes people complain?

I can think of several reasons:

First, this announcement was a surprise. Microsoft has, for the past several years, released Windows 10 and kept the hardware requirements unchanged. Those requirements allowed for a broad swath of PCs to run Windows 10. (I myself have PCs from 2007 and 2012 that are running Windows 10.) There has been nothing in the messages from Microsoft that Windows 10 would be replaced, or that hardware requirements would change. Until now.

Second, the new requirements have dropped support for a lot of PCs, and perhaps folks are still using these older PCs. By raising the hardware bar for Windows, Microsoft has declared some (okay, lots of) PCs are "unworthy". If a person happens to have one of those PCs, they may consider this an insult.

But the reason I truly suspect is a different one.

Past updates and changes to hardware requirements have had clear benefits. When Windows/386 wanted a VGA card, we understood that the graphics capabilities of earlier video cards were not sufficient for the desired experience. When an operating system required a 16-bit card for the network interface, we understood that the transfer speeds of the older 8-bit cards were not sufficient. When Windows NT required an Intel 386 processor, we understood that the older 8088 and 80286 processors were not sufficient to provide multitasking the way we wanted it.

With past upgrades, we understood the reasons for the required hardware. That's not true with Windows 11.

Windows 11 needs a certain amount of memory and disk space; that's understood. It also needs the TPM 2 chip; we understand that. But Windows 11 has requirements for a certain, not-well-understood subset of Intel processors. (It's not clear that Microsoft understands the subset, either.)

Part of the problem is Intel's product line. Intel has gobs of processor models. It has so many that the old names of "8088" and "80286" or "Pentium 1" and "Pentium 3" don't work. Instead, Intel uses letters and numbers, something like i7-6550 and i5-5204. (Those aren't real models; I made them up. Or maybe they are real, maybe I hit on actual product numbers. But you get the idea.)

Intel has shipped, over the past decade, possibly thousands of different processor models, each with  different features. Most people don't care about most of the differences. The typical person looks at the processor clock speed and the number of cores, and little else. Hardware enthusiasts and game players may look at socket type and cache size.

Only the folks who write operating systems and low-level drivers go beyond those to look at the arcane aspects of the different processors. Those aspects can include the handling of interrupts, privileged execution of certain instructions, fixes to errors in the instruction set, virtual memory, and virtual machines.

It is these differences that are important to Microsoft. Windows has to work with all of those processors. It has to handle the quirks of each processor. It has to "know" that it can trust an instruction on some processors and not trust it on others. All of those quirks add up, and they can interact in strange and subtle ways.

On top of that, Microsoft has to test each of those configurations (preferably on real processors, not simulations). That means that Microsoft has to maintain a large collection of hardware.

By limiting the processors to those designed and shipped in the past three years, Microsoft eliminates the older processors and in so doing reduces the variation that they cause. The reduced set of processors allows for (relatively) simpler code for Windows, and a simpler test process.

But none of this is obvious. Microsoft has not said "we're limiting the supported processors to those we can test on", nor have they said "we're limiting the supported processors to those that have these (insert arcane aspect) features".

All we have is a vague announcement. (And I will say that the whole "Windows 11" announcement seems rushed. It doesn't have the depth and details of previous announcements from Microsoft. But that's another topic.)

That vague announcement does not give us understanding. And because we don't understand the reasons, we resent the change. That's basic psychology.

I will close with a few thoughts:

- Microsoft, I think, has thought about Windows 11 and its requirements, and has made a good decision.
- That decision is not available to us, so we see the change as arbitrary.
- It is easy to resent what we do not understand.
- Microsoft was probably surprised by the reaction to the announcement, and may be working on more announcements.
- While I don't understand Microsoft's decision, I have faith that they have a good process.

A poor message can hide a good process; let's wait for more information.

Also - Microsoft is not alone in changing hardware requirements. Apple has done so with every new version of macOS (I think). Even Linux drops support for older systems. I have an old 32-bit MacBook running Ubuntu 16.04 with no way to upgrade because Ubuntu now requires 64-bit processors.

Windows 11 is for the enterprise

Microsoft's recent announcement of Windows 11 has gotten a lot of people asking questions? Why now? Why the change for minimum requirements? And why was the announcement so plain and unassuming?

I think the answer lies in Microsoft's customers for Windows. So let's look at the different types of customers. We can see that there are a few different types of customers for Windows.

Enterprises: Large companies with lots of computers. They authenticate with Exchange. They use Microsoft Office, SQL Server, and other Microsoft products. They buy lots of licenses. They pay for support. And -- importantly -- they depreciate computers over a three year schedule, and they frequently replace computers every three years. They have dedicated IT support teams (possibly outsourced or contractors) and they have discussions and plans for IT.

We can consider large non-profit organizations and large government agencies in this group, as long as they replace their computers every three years.

Small businesses: Companies with fewer computers (probably less than 100). They don't use Exchange for authentication; they assign everyone a computer with a password and share data via workgroups. They use the software that comes with the computer (Windows and Office). And they don't replace their computers every three years; they keep them longer.

Small business do not (typically) have plans for IT, other than "keep things running and replace computers when they fail". They let their computers age in place, with no specific plans to upgrade Windows or applications.

We can consider small non-profit organizations and small government agencies in this group, as long as they don't have formal plans to replace computers every three years.

Typical individuals: Like small businesses, they have few computers, they use the software that comes with the computer (possibly Office 365), and they keep their computers for longer than three years. They, too, let their computers age in place.

Enthusiasts: These are individuals who enjoy tinkering with hardware or software. Like the typical individual, they have a few computers. Unlike the typical individual, they take a more active interest in IT. They probably have more computers than the typical individual, and they tend to have some computers with the latest versions of Windows. (They may also have older computers with older versions of Windows, just for fun.)

Enthusiasts were important in the early days of Windows. They downloaded beta versions, showed Windows to their friends, and learned how to make Windows work on different types of hardware. The were an important part of the "Windows revolution" over DOS.

Gamers: These individuals have few computers. They take an interest in hardware, and software when it helps their gaming experience. They use powerful computers, either built by themselves or off-the-shelf with custom video and replaced disk. They may replace equipment every three years; the time is driven not by depreciation schedules but by hardware and game software.

Browsers: Individuals who use Windows like a Chromebook. That is, they have a computer running Windows but they use only web apps. They don't use local applications (not even Office). Like typical users, they have no plans for upgrades and tend to use computers for a long time.

With these different groups in mind, we can gain some insight into Microsoft's motivations.

Microsoft's announcement for Windows 11, and specifically the requirements for 64-bit, and TPM 2.0, limit Windows 11 to recent computers. This is going to cause some problems for some users, because the equipment they currently have will not support Windows 11. But look at the groups, and see which will be affected:

Small businesses, typical individuals, and browsers will not be affected by Windows 11. They probably do not run the latest version of Windows 10, and may be running Windows 8.1 or even Windows 7. (The latter is unlikely due to the lack of support for Internet Explorer.)

Enterprise businesses will not be affected (much) by Windows 11. They will have equipment that is ready to run Windows 11 (thanks to their policy of replacing computers every three years) and they have an IT support team who can coordinate the installation of the new version. (That IT group may not be happy about a new version of Windows, but they can handle the task.)

The groups most affected by Windows 11 will be gamers and enthusiasts. Gamers will have to review the benefits of Windows 11, and will probably replace older PCs when games come out that are for Windows 11 only. Enthusiasts will be the hardest hit: their curated older hardware that is running Windows 10 (because it can) will not be able to run Windows 11. They will have to pony up for new hardware (and find space for it, while keeping their older PCs).

So my conclusion is this: Windows 11 is for the enterprise. Microsoft is targeting enterprise customers (the ones who pay lots of licensing fees) and keeping them happy. (Enterprises love security!)

The other types of users are going along for the ride. Small businesses and typical individuals won't be affected (they already have hardware, and when they buy new PCs they will come with Windows 11).

The folks most affected will be the enthusiasts who won't be able to install Windows 11 on their old hardware. (And probably won't be able to install Windows 10 after its end-of-life in 2025.) That's a small crowd, and they are less important today than they were in the early days of Windows.

Microsoft cannot support old hardware forever. The advantages of increased security are obvious and necessary. A special version of Windows 11 ("Windows 11 minus"? "Windows for the tinkerers"?) that supports older (less secure) hardware would require a lot of time and effort, and the return for that time and effort would be very small.

The enthusiasts and tinkerers need another home, one that is not dominated by the concerns (and economics) of the enterprise.

IBM and Apple innovate in different ways

Two of the most influential companies in the PC universe are IBM and Apple. There are others, including Microsoft. But I want to compare just IBM and Apple. These two companies have similarities, and differences.

IBM and Apple are both hardware companies. Apple is still a hardware company, although its main business is phones and not computers. IBM is more of a services company; it was a hardware company in 1981 when it introduced the IBM PC.

Both companies innovated and both companies created designs that influence the market today.

IBM introduced the detached keyboard (other systems were all-in-one designs or keyboard-and-CPU with a separate display). IBM also introduced the internal hard drive, the original 8-inch floppy disk, the 3.5-inch floppy disk, the ThinkPad TrackPoint (the "pointing stick"), and the VGA display and video card.

Apple introduced the mouse for personal computers (the original mouse was two decades earlier and for a system much larger than a PC), the PowerBook laptop (a year before the first ThinkPad), AppleTalk, touchscreen for iPhones, and (notably) iTunes which gave consumers a reliable, legal way to load music onto their devices.

Apple stands out in that it innovates not just by adding features, but by removing them. Apple was first in delivering a computer without a floppy drive, and then a computer without a CD drive. Apple famously removed the headphone jack from its phones. It also omitted the Home, End, PgUp, and PgDn keys on its laptops, going back as far as the first PowerBook. (As the PowerBook was not compatible with the IBM PC, it had no need of those keys.)

Apple, more than IBM or any other hardware supplier, has innovated by removing things. The makers of Windows PCs and laptops had typically followed Apple's lead. They have, over time, removed floppy drives, CD drives, and most laptops now require specific multi-key presses for Home, End, PgUp, and PgDn.

IBM innovated by adding features. Apple innovates by trimming away features. That's quite a difference.

Of course, one can remove only so much. Apple has trimmed the phone to a simple slab with a single port for charging and data transfer. It has trimmed the Macbook to a thin wedge that opens to a screen, keyboard, and trackpad. There is very little left to remove, which means that Apple has little room to innovate along its traditional methods.

But notice that Apple's innovation-by-reduction has been in hardware. Its operating systems are not the equivalent of a slim wedge. To the contrary, Apple's mac OS and iOS are somewhat bulky, which is something Apple shares with Windows and Linux.

Of the major operating systems, mac OS probably has the best chance of slimming. Apple has the "remove things to make it better" mindset, which helps to remove features. Apple also has close integration between operating system and hardware, and drops support for older hardware, which lets it remove drivers for older devices. Windows and Linux, in contrast, want to support as much hardware as they can, which means adding drivers and allowing for older devices.

Let's see if Apple's "less is more" approach works it way into mac OS and into Swift, Apple's favored language for development.

Praise for Microsoft

I am not Microsoft's biggest fan. I disliked their products and strategies in the 1990s, when they had a virtual monopoly on desktop operating systems, office software, and development tools. Yet I must give them credit for two recent products: OneDrive and Visual Studio Code.

OneDrive

OneDrive synchronizes files across multiple devices. I can store a file in OneDrive on computer A and later retrieve it on computer B. OneDrive stores data on Microsoft's servers and associates it with my account. If I log in to a Windows computer with my ID and password, I can see all of my files on OneDrive. The files are not copied to the local computer, they are simply available for me to view, change, or delete.

OneDrive also provides storage for online services such as Office Online. This lets me use any computer, even a public one in a library. (I think. I have yet to try this. But it makes sense for Microsoft to do things this way.)

Visual Studio Code

The other product that deserves credit is Visual Studio Code.

Microsoft advertises Visual Studio Code as an editor, yet it is much more. It edits, color-highlights, checks syntax, refactors, debugs (at least with Python), and integrates with git. It has an impressive array of features in a small package. What is significant is that the features are just the right set -- at least for me, and I suspect a large number of developers. It is not weighed down with all of the features of Microsoft's classic Visual Studio package. Visual Studio Code omits the templates and the auto-generation. It replaces the package manager with a series of lightweight plug-ins. It seems to ignore Team Foundation Server (and services), although I could be mistaken about that. (Perhaps there is an enterprise version of VS Code that connects to TFS.)

Beyond the feature set, Visual Studio Code... works. It's a competent product, one that feels good to use. It has just enough to get the job done, and it gets the job done well. I feel comfortable using it. (And that's a rare thing with me and Microsoft products.)

Visual Studio Code is a departure from the traditional Microsoft approach to software. The old Microsoft built software for Windows -- and Windows only. (A few exceptions were made for Mac OS.) Visual Studio Code breaks from that tradition: it is available for Windows, Mac OS, and Linux. This is indeed a ground-breaking project.

OneDrive and Visual Studio Code make for a pleasant experience when developing code. Microsoft deserves credit for bold choices and good tools. If you have not tried them, I recommend that you do.

What have you got to lose?

Rebels need the Empire

The PC world is facing a crisis. It is a silent crisis, one that few people understand.

That crisis is the evil empire, or more specifically, the lack of an evil empire.

For the entire age of personal computers, we have had an evil empire. The empire changed over time, but there was always one. And that empire was the unifying force for the rebellion.

The first empire was IBM. Microcomputer enthusiasts were fighting this empire of large, expensive mainframe computers. We fought it with small, inexpensive (compared to mainframes) computers. We offered small, interactive, "friendly" programs written in BASIC in opposition to batch mainframe systems written in COBOL. The rebellion used Apple II, TRS-80, and other small systems to unite and fight for liberty. This rebellion was successful. So successful that IBM decided to get in on the personal computer action.

The second empire was also IBM. The IBM PC became the standard for computing, and the diverse set of computers prior to the IBM model 5150 was wiped out. Rebels refused to use IBM PCs and attempted to keep non-PC-compatible computers financially viable. That struggle was lost, and the IBM design became the standard design. Once Compaq introduced a PC-compatible (and didn't get sued) other manufacturers introduced their own PC compatibles. The one remnant of this rebellion was Apple, who made non-compatible computers for quite some time.

The third empire was Microsoft. The makers of IBM-compatible PCs needed an operating system and Microsoft was happy to sell them MS-DOS. IBM challenged Microsoft with OS/2 (itself a joint venture with Microsoft) but Microsoft introduced Windows and made it successful. Microsoft was so successful that its empire was, at times, considered larger and grander than IBM mainframe empire. The rebellion against Microsoft took some time to form, but it did arise as the "open source" movement.

But Microsoft has fallen from its position as evil empire. It still holds a majority of desktop computer operating systems, but the world of computing has expanded to web servers, smartphones, and cloud systems, and these are outside of Microsoft's control.

In tandem with Microsoft's decline, open source has become accepted as the norm. As such, it is no longer the rebellion. The software market exists in tripartite: Windows, macOS, and Linux. Each is an acceptable solution.

Those two changes -- Microsoft no longer the evil empire and open source no longer the rebellion -- mean that, at the moment, there is no evil empire.

Some companies have large market shares of certain segments. Amazon.com dominates the web services and cloud market -- but competitors are reasonable and viable options. Microsoft dominates the desktop market, especially the corporate desktop market, but Apple is a possible choice for the corporate desktop.

No one vendor controls the hardware market.

Facebook dominates in social media, but is facing significant challenges in areas of privacy and "fake news". Other media channels like Twitter are looking to gain at Facebook's expense.

Even programming languages have no dominant player. According to the November report from Tiobe, Java and C have been the two most popular languages and neither is gaining significantly. The next three (C++, Python, and VB.net) are close, as are the five following (C#, JavaScript, PHP, SQL, and Go). No language is emerging as a dominant language, as we had with BASIC in the 1980s and Visual Basic in the 1990s.

A world without an evil empire is a new world for us. Personal computers were born under an evil empire, operating systems matured under an evil empire, and open source became respectable under an evil empire. I like to think that such innovations were driven (or at least inspired) by a rebellion, an active group of people who rejected the market leader.

Today we have no such empire. Will innovation continue without one? Will we see new hardware, new programming languages, new tools? Or will the industry stagnate as major plays focus more on market share and less on innovation?

If the latter, then perhaps someday a new market leader will emerge, strong enough to win the title of "evil empire" and rebels will again drive innovation.

Apple Copies Microsoft

We're familiar with the story behind Windows, and how Microsoft created Windows to compete with Apple's Macintosh. (And tech-savvy folks know how Apple copied the Xerox Star to make the Macintosh -- but that's not important here.)

Apple has just recently copied Microsoft.

In a small way.

They did it with the numbering scheme for iPhones. Apple released two iPhones this year, the iPhone 8 and the iPhone X (which Apple insists is pronounced "ten").

There is no iPhone 9.

So what does this have to do with Microsoft?

Back in 2015, Microsoft released Windows 10. It was the successor to Windows 8 (or Windows 8.1, if you want to be picky).

There is no Windows 9.

There was Windows 95 and Windows 98, collectively referred to as "Windows 9x". Some software identified those versions with the test

windowsVersion.startswith("9")

which works for Windows 95 and Windows 98 -- and probably doesn't do what you want on an imaginary Windows 9 operating system. So "Windows 10" came to be.

Apple, of course, never had an "iPhone 95" or an "iPhone 98", so they didn't have the same problem as Microsoft. They picked "iPhone X" to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the iPhone.

Did they realize that they were following Microsoft's lead? Perhaps. Perhaps not.

I'm not concerned that Apple is going to follow Microsoft in other matters.

But I do find it amusing.

Three models of computing

Computing comes in different flavors. We're probably most familiar with personal computers and web applications. Let's look at the models used by different vendors.

Apple has the simplest model: Devices that compute. Apple has built it's empire on high-quality personal computing devices. They do not offer cloud computing services. (They do offer their "iCloud" backup service, which is an accessory to the central computing of the iMac or Macbook.) I have argued that this model is the same as personal computing in the 1970s.

Google has a different model: web-based computing. This is obvious in their Chromebook, which is a lightweight computer that can run a browser -- and nothing else. All of the "real" computing occurs on the servers in Google's data center. The same approach is visible in most of the Google Android apps -- lightweight apps that communicate with servers. In some ways, this model is an update of the 1970s minicomputer model, with terminals connected to a central processor.

Microsoft has a third model, a hybrid of the two. In Microsoft's model, some computing occurs on the personal computer and some occurs in the data center. It is the most interesting of the two, requiring communication and coordination of two components.

Microsoft did not always have their current approach. Their original model was the same as Apple's: personal computers as complete and independent computing entities. Microsoft started with implementations of the BASIC language, and then sold PC-DOS to IBM. Even early versions of Windows were for stand-alone, independent PCs.

Change to that model started with Windows for Workgroups, and became serious with Windows NT, domains, and ActiveDirectory. Those three components allowed for networked computing and distributed processing. (There were network solutions from other vendors, but the Microsoft set was a change in Microsoft's strategy.)

Today, Microsoft offers an array of services under its "Azure" mark. Azure provides servers, message queues, databases, and other services, all hosted in its cloud environment. They allow individuals and companies to create applications that can combine PC and cloud technologies. These applications perform some computing on the local PC and some computing in the Azure cloud. You can, of course, build an application that runs completely on the PC, or completely in the cloud. That you can build those applications shows the flexibility of the Microsoft platform.

I think this hybrid model, combining local computing and server-based computing, has the best potential. It is more complex, but it can handle a wider variety of applications than either the PC-only solution (Apple's) or the server-only solution (Google's). Look for Microsoft to support this model with development tools, operating systems, and communication protocols and libraries.

Looking forward, I can see Microsoft working on a "fluid" model of computing, where some processing can move from the server to the local PC (for systems with powerful local PCs) and from the PC to the server (for systems with limited PCs).

Many things in the IT realm started in a "fixed" configuration, and over time have become more flexible. I think processing is about to join them.

Evangelism from Microsoft

Microsoft has designated certain employees as "evangelists": people knowledgeable in the details of specific products and competent at presentations.

It strikes me that the folks in the evangelist role were mostly, well, preaching to the choir. They would appear at events where one would expect Microsoft users, fans, and enthusiasts to gather.

I'm not sure that Microsoft needs them, and it seems that Microsoft is coming to the same conclusion. A recent blog post on MSDN seems to indicate that the Developer Evangelist group is being disbanded. (The post is vague.)

Can Microsoft compete (and survive) without the evangelist team? I believe that they can.

First, I believe that Satya Nadella is confident in his position as CEO of Microsoft, and that confidence flows down to the entire company.

Second, I believe that Microsoft has confidence in the direction of its products and services. It has ceased being the "Windows company" in which everything revolved around Windows. Today, Microsoft has embraced outside technologies (namely open source) and developed its cloud services (Azure), competing successfully with them.

In short, Microsoft feels good about its current position and its future.

With such confidence in its products and services, Microsoft doesn't need the re-assurance of evangelists. Perhaps they were there to tell Microsoft -- not customers -- that its products were good. Now Microsoft believes it without their help.

Apple's Files App is an admission of imperfection

When Apple introduced the iPhone, they introduced not just a smart phone but a new approach to computing. The iPhone experience was a new, simpler experience for the user. The iPhone (and iOS) did away with much of the administrative work of PCs. It eliminated the notion of user accounts and administrator accounts. Updates were automatic and painless. Apps knew how to get their data. The phone "just worked".

The need for a Files app is an admission that the iPad experience does not meet those expectations. It raises the hood and allows the user to meddle with some of the innards of the iPhone. One explanation for its existence is that Apps cannot always find the needed files, and the Files App lets you (the user) find those files.

Does anyone see the irony in making the user do the work that the computer should do? Especially a computer from Apple?

To be fair, Android has had File Manager apps for years, so the Android experience does not meet those expectations either. Microsoft's Surface tablets, starting with the first one, have had Windows Explorer built in, so they are failing to provide the new, simpler experience too.

A curmudgeon might declare that the introduction of the Files App shows that even Apple cannot provide the desired user experience, and if Apple can't do it then no one can.

I'm not willing to go that far.

I will say that the original vision of a simple, easy-to-use, reliable computing device still holds. It may be that the major players have not delivered on that vision, but that doesn't mean the vision is unobtainable.

It may be that the iPhone (and Android) are steps in a larger process, one starting with the build-it-yourself microcomputers of the mid 1970s, passing through IBM PCs with DOS and later PC-compatibles with Windows, and currently with iPhones and tablets. Perhaps we will see a new concept in personal computing, one that improves upon the iPhone experience. It may be as different from iPhone and Android as those operating systems are from Windows and MacOS. It may be part of the "internet of things" and expand personal computing to household appliances.

I'm looking forward to it.

Microsoft's GVFS for git makes git a different thing

Microsoft is rather proud of their GVFS filesystem for git, but I think they don't understand quite what it is that they have done.

GVFS, in short, changes git into a different thing. The plain git is a distributed version control system. When combined with GVFS, git becomes... well, let's back up a bit.

A traditional, non-distributed version control system consists of a central repository which holds files, typically source code. Users "check out" files, make changes, and "check in" the revised files. While users have copies of the files on their computers, the central repository is the only place that holds all of the files and all of the revisions to the files. It is the one place with all information, and is a single point of failure.

A distributed version control system, in contrast, stores a complete set of files and revisions on each user's computer. Each user has a complete repository. A new user clones a repository from an existing team member and has a a complete set of files and revisions, ready to go. The repositories are related through parent-child links; the new user in our example has a repository that is a child of the cloned repository. Each repository is a clone, except for the very first instance, which could be considered the 'root' repository. The existence of these copies provides redundancy and guards against a failure of the central repository in traditional version control systems.

Now let's look at GVFS and how it changes git.

GVFS replaces the local copy of a repository with a set of virtual files. The files in a repository are stored in a central location and downloaded only when needed. When checked in, the files are uploaded to the central location, not the local repository (which doesn't exist). From the developer's perspective, the changes made by GVFS are transparent. Git behaves just as it did before. (Although with GVFS, large repositories perform better than with regular git.)

Microsoft's GVFS changes the storage of repositories. It does not eliminate the multiple copies of the repository; each user retains their own copy. It does move those copies to the central server. (Or servers. The blog entry does not specify.)

I suppose you could achieve the same effect (almost) with regular git by changing the location of the .git directory. Instead of a local drive, you could use a directory on an off-premise server. If everyone did this, if every stored their git repository on the same server (say, a corporate server), you would have something similar to git with GVFS. (It is not exactly the same, as GVFS does some other things to improve performance.)

Moving the git repositories off of individual, distributed computers and onto a single, central server changes the idea of a distributed version control system. The new configuration is something in between the traditional version control system and a distributed version control system.

Microsoft had good reason to make this change. The performance of standard git was not acceptable for a very large team. I don't fault them for it. And I think it can be a good change.

Yet it does make git a different creature. I think Microsoft and the rest of the industry should recognize that.