An imaginary Windows version of the Chromebook

Acer and HP have cloudbooks - laptop computers outfitted with Windows and a browser - but they are not really the equivalent of a Chromebook.

A Chromebook is a lightweight laptop computer (in both physical weight and computing power) equipped with a browser and just enough of an operating system to run the browser. (And some configuration screens. And the ssh program.) As such, they have minimal administrative overhead.

Cloudbooks - the Acer and HP versions - are lightweight laptops equipped with the full Windows operating system. Since they have the entire Windows operating system, they have the entire Windows administrative "load".

Chromebooks have been selling well (possibly due to their low prices). Cloudbooks have been selling... well, I don't know. There are only a few models from Acer and a few models from HP; much fewer than the plethora of Chromebooks from numerous manufacturers. My guess is that they are selling in only modest quantities.

Would a true "Windows Chromebook" sell? Possibly. Let's imagine one.

It would have to use a different configuration than the current cloudbooks. It would have to be a lightweight laptop with just enough of an operating system to run the browser. A Windows cloudbook would need a browser (let's pick the new Edge browser) and stripped-down version of Windows that is just enough to run it.

I suspect that the components of Windows are cross-dependent and one cannot easily build a stripped-down version. Creating such a version of Windows would require the re-engineering of Windows. But since this is an imaginary device, let's imagine a smaller, simpler version of Windows.

This Windows cloudbook would have to match the price of the Chromebooks. That should be possible for hardware; the licensing fees for Windows may push the price upwards.

Instead of locally-installed software, everything would run in the browser. To compete with Google Docs, our cloudbook would have Microsoft Office 365.

But then: Who would buy it?

I can see five possible markets: enterprises, individual professionals, home users, students, and developers.

Enterprises could purchase cloudbooks and issue them to employees. This would reduce the expenditures for PC equipment but might require different licenses for professional software. Typical office jobs that require Word and Excel could shift to the web-based versions of those products. Custom software may have to run in virtual desktops accessed through the company's intranet. Such a configuration may make it easier for a more mobile workforce, as applications would run from servers and data would be stored on servers, not local PCs.

Individual professionals might prefer a cloudbook to a full Windows laptop. Then again, they might not. (I suspect most independent professionals using Windows are using laptops and not desktops.) I'm not sure what value the professional receives by switching from laptop to cloudbook. (Except, maybe, a lighter and less expensive laptop.)

Home users with computers will probably keep using them, and purchase a cloudbook only when they need it. (Such as when their old computer dies.)

Students could use cloudbooks as easily as the use Chromebooks.

Developers might use cloudbooks, but for them they would need tools available in their browser. Microsoft has development tools that run in the browser, and so do other companies.

But for any of these users, I see them using a Chromebook just as easily as using a Windows cloudbook. Microsoft Office 365 runs in the Chrome and Firefox browsers on Mac OSX and on Linux. (There are apps for iOS and Android, although limited in capabilities.)

There is no advantage to using a Windows cloudbook  -- even our imaginary cloudbook -- over a Chromebook.

Perhaps Microsoft is working on such an advantage.

Their Windows RT operating system was an attempt at a reduced-complexity configuration suitable for running a tablet (the ill-fated Surface RT). But Microsoft departed from our imagined configuration in a number of ways. The Surface RT:

- was released before Office 365 was available
- used special versions of Word and Excel
- had a complex version of Windows, reduced in size but still requiring administration

People recognized the Surface RT for what it was: a low-powered device that could run Word and Excel and little else. It had a browser, and it had the ability to run apps from the Microsoft store, but the store was lacking. And while limited in use, it still required administration.

A revised cloudbook may get a warmer reception than the Surface RT. But it needs to focus on the browser, not locally-installed apps. It has to have a simpler version of Windows. And it has to have something special to appeal to at least one of the groups above -- probably the enterprise group.

If we see a Windows cloudbook, look for that special something. That extra feature will make cloudbooks successful.

Microsoft's big chance in the mobile world

Apple (via iOS) and Google (via Android) have taken a lead in mobile platforms. Microsoft's offerings (Windows Phone and Windows RT) have received a cool reception. Yet I see hope for Microsoft.

iPhones, iPads, and Android devices have become popular with consumers (average folks like you and me) and have limited acceptance in the corporate world. I think Microsoft has an opportunity in the corporate market.

I see three reasons:

IT shops tend to be conservative Many IT shops have strong preferences for Microsoft equipment. It works, and changing to another vendor always entails risk.

The role of mobile devices in the corporation is still undefined We know how to use phones and tablets as individuals (play games, read books, and chat on Facebook) but we don't (yet) see how mobile devices help business. Yes, there are a few specialized applications, such as documentation for aircraft pilots or apps for insurance adjusters. The corporate world is an open field.

iOS and Android platforms change frequently The iPhone has seen five generations, and Android has seen almost as many significant versions in its (relatively) short life. Later versions have forced changes to the design of apps, from internals to the UI. Such changes reduce the life of apps and add to the cost, as one revises an app for the new operating system.

With this environment, Microsoft has an opening. Microsoft can offer Windows RT and provide longer support for each version. And I am specifically looking at Windows RT, the variant that does not run Windows classic applications.

Longer support for versions of Windows RT is necessary, but not sufficient. In addition to a stable platform, Microsoft must offer tools for developers. Not just a version of Visual Studio that builds code for Windows RT, but libraries to connect Windows RT apps to Azure and other (non-Microsoft!) cloud services. Not just support forums, but code to handle authentication and payments. Not just UI designers but modules to connect legacy corporate data to Azure (and thereby to mobile devices).

Apple and Android have shown that mobile devices are technically feasible and that there is a demand for them. Now Microsoft has the opportunity to show that they can contribute to business.

The coming split of Windows

Microsoft has always had a "Windows on every PC" philosophy, since the dawn of Windows. (Prior to the first release of Windows, the philosophy was "Microsoft software on every PC".) The new releases of Windows 8 for PC and smart phones continues that philosophy.

I think that philosophy is changing.

The different platforms of tablets, desktop PCs, and servers, are, well, different. They have different needs, and they serve different purposes. This is especially visible with the Surface RT, which doesn't run Windows EXE files. (Technically, it does. It runs the Office EXE files for Word and Excel. Windows RT does not allow you to install EXE files.)

In the mobile/cloud world, the tablet and server run different programs, with different purposes and with very different designs. Tablets focus on the user interface, and servers handle data storage and calculations. Even today, Windows for the desktop is different from Windows Server.

I expect Microsoft to move away from "one Windows on every platform" and introduce variants of Windows for each platform. Microsoft will keep the "Windows" name; it is a recognized and trusted brand. But the Windows for tablets (Windows RT) will be different from the Windows for servers (Windows Server) and those will be different for Windows for the desktop. I expect Windows Phone to be very similar to Windows RT.

Such a product line matches Apple's offerings, and in a sense matches Google's. Apple iOS powers phones and tablets; MacOS powers their desktops. Google offers Android for phones and tablets, ChromeOS powers their laptop, and they have a number of cloud offerings for server-based computing.

A split along hardware lines also makes sense technically. The three platforms offer different capabilities and must provide different types of services. Mobile devices must be location-aware; servers must provide fail-over and reliability and probably run as virtual servers. Forcing one Windows API on all platforms is wasteful.

Microsoft could handle this split by forking the code base and developing different products, but they have another option: modules. They may choose to make Windows modular, using a single kernel with modules that can be added to build different configurations. A modular Windows is not that far-fetched; Windows already has a kernel/module design. In addition, it creates possibilities for other combinations, such as a specific Windows for embedded systems, another Windows for gaming, and yet another Windows for high-reliability systems.

I think the future of Windows is one of multiple variants, each serving a specific need.

Steve Ballmer Steps Down

Steve Ballmer, CEO of Microsoft, announced that he would step down in the next twelve months. Folks have been quick to respond, some cheering and some asking the question: Was he pushed?

The almost-unanimous view of Ballmer's stewardship has been one of dismay if not outright failure. People cite Microsoft's delay into the tablet market, the poor reception of Windows 8, and other products such as the Kin and Zune. (With an occasional reference to "Microsoft Bob".)

I say "almost-unanimous" because I dissent from this view. Yes, Microsoft did enter the tablet market later than Apple and Google. Yes, Windows 8 is quite different from previous versions. But Microsoft has bee giving its customers what they want, and in that they are not to be considered a failure.

Microsoft's customers are mostly businesses, and they are a self-centered lot. I have seen several businesses respond to new versions of Windows, and the responses have been uniform: make this new version work like the old version.

Businesses, for the most part, do not want a new version of Windows. Businesses want to go about their business and not worry about computers or GUIs or databases. Many businesses today run Windows XP, seeing no need to move to later versions.

The complaints about Microsoft seem inconsistent. People criticize Microsoft for delivering the systems that they want, while also complain that Microsoft delivers nothing new. And now that Microsoft has delivered something new, people complain about that.

I think of Windows RT as a suitable operating system for tablets. I consider the Surface RT tablet a competitor in the iPad and Android tablets. A bit pricey perhaps, yet good technology. I consider the Surface Pro a compromise tablet, a transition from the classic Windows environment to Windows RT.

The lack of apps for the Surface RT is a problem, but only for the consumer market, and I view the Surface RT as a device for the office. In the office, it is not consumer apps that are important but the apps used by the business, many of them in-house apps. Businesses will create their own apps, just as they have created their own documents and spreadsheets.

I look on the Surface as a successful product. I see Windows RT as a valid path forward. I see Windows 8 as an interesting mix of the old and new technologies.

Given these accomplishments, I view Steve Ballmer as a success. He moved Microsoft into new directions and introduced new products. Microsoft's products did not take the world by storm, or establish a new monopoly. But they are worthy contenders.

Microsoft's Future is not Windows

Many Windows users are hostile to Windows 8 and the Modern interface. They want Windows to remain what it is.

I think most people have defined Windows as "the thing that runs Microsoft Office". Graphic artists have defined Windows as "the thing that runs Photoshop". Developers have defined Windows as "the thing that runs Visual Studio". A few shops build turnkey scheduling and billing systems for doctors offices, a few others build turnkey point-of-sale systems. Those are the bounds of Windows.

Microsoft, on the other hand, views Windows as a product, a source of revenue.

A bounded market is limited. Microsoft knows this, and I suspect that the limited nature of Windows was a motivation for the Surface RT and Windows RT.

This difference between Microsoft and Windows users is the problem: Microsoft wants a growing market, and users want the existing technology. The two are not compatible.

As I see it, Microsoft's path forward is Windows RT, the new operating system that does not run existing Windows applications. Windows 8, with its support of classic Windows apps and its ability to run "Modern" Windows apps is a transition, a step from the old Windows to the new.

Abandoning the classic Windows API with its collection of applications is not a simple task. Many people rely on various applications. Users are unhappy with the idea of changing to a new platform.

But from Microsoft's view, the revenues (and profits) of classic Windows are limited. The sales of PCs are declining, as consumers switch from desktops to tablets. Businesses have PCs and may replace existing units, but they can also hang on to PCs and buy new ones only when necessary. And keeping the classic Windows product line (Windows, Office, Visual Studio, etc.) alive is expensive. The competition of products like Linux, LibreOffice, and Eclipse puts further limits on revenue. Classic Windows has declining revenue and constant (or growing) expenses.

Microsoft is moving its products to mobile/cloud not because it wants to, not because it delights in the torment of its customers, but because it must. The economics of the market are forcing this change.

Windows fans see the glass half-empty

Microsoft has introduced Windows 8 and its companion Windows RT. The reaction from a number of Windows fans has been less than positive. Consider these articles:

From Infoworld: Forget about Windows 'Blue' -- stay focused on Windows 7

From InformationWeek: Tell Me Again: Why Rush Into Windows 8?

From Byte (a property of InformationWeek): Windows Blue's Got Me Down and Windows Blue/9: No Desktop? No Way!

A few observations:

Some reviews are fair criticisms, others are nostalgic almost-rants: Windows 8 is not a perfect product, nor is Windows RT, nor is the Surface tablet. Some reviews point out their weak areas: battery life, responsive to touch (or not), and consistency of user experience. Other reviews focus on the feature lost: the "Start" button and plug-ins for Internet Explorer (IE).

This opinion is not universal: These magazines are long-time fans of PC computing. In contrast, Dr. Dobbs is neutral about Windows 8 and PC Week has published several positive articles.

This negativity is new (for Windows): Previous releases of Windows have been met with approval from almost all Windows fans.

A reluctance to change: The disapproving users want Windows to remain the way it is. They want the "Start" button. They want to "boot to the desktop".

The Windows user base is not in agreement about the new Windows 8 offering. This is not a bad thing: A collection as large as the Windows user base will most likely contain diversity of opinions.

The negativity in the user base is, I believe, a new phenomenon in the Microsoft community. Previous changes in technology (Windows 95, Windows NT, the .NET platform, the C# programming language) were greeted with cheers. People immediately looked at the new capabilities in these technologies.

(OK, I will admit that Windows Vista was greeted with raspberries. But its problems were many and complaints were legitimate. Vista lacked drivers, demanded hardware, and offered few obvious improvements beyond a pretty desktop.)

The reluctance to change is, perhaps, the most significant of these observations. Microsoft supporters have long been willing to try new things, and often looked at new tech with envy. Microsoft may have built an empire, but the programmers were still in the Rebel Alliance -- scrappy, inventive, and risk-taking.

One can put forward a number of theories for this conservative shift in the fans. Most obvious is that the fans have built small kingdoms of their own, and the new tech threatens their standing in the empire.

A slightly uglier theory poses that Microsoft fans have aged, and the older versions of themselves are "too old for this sort of thing". (Yet Obi-wan Kenobi did a pretty good job, in spite of that claim.)

I have two pet theories:

Theory one: The Microsoft fans were surprised by the speed of the changes. They were not expecting the large change from desktop to mobile/cloud that is Windows RT and Azure. Being the emotional creatures that we humans are, they are reacting with fear and anger.

Theory two: The Microsoft fans are angry with the deprecation (or perceived deprecation) of Microsoft technologies such as Silverlight, IE plug-ins, direct access to hardware, and self-administration of systems. The loss of these (and other) technologies means that much hard-won knowledge is now worthless, and new knowledge must be gained.

I don't know which of these theories is correct. In a sense, it doesn't matter, because I have another theory.

The reason behind the negative thinking is not important. The negative thinking is the important thing. And I theorize that the people with the negative reviews of Windows 8, Windows RT, the Metro interface, and Azure will accomplish very little with those technologies. I theorize that the people asking for the "Start" button will stay with Windows 7 and its technologies.

I further predict that it will be the people who point at Metro and say "hey, this is cool!" will be the folks who deliver interesting apps and services for Windows 8.

Of the two groups, I prefer to work with the "hey this is cool!" people.

Overfishing your ecosystem

Vendors must execute their business carefully. Is the business providing a platform for others? A turn-key system? A multi-platform application? Doing one of these things well is difficult. Doing all of them well is much harder. It is easy to grow one sector at the expense of another.

Microsoft fell into this trap.

Early in its history, Microsoft was the provider of BASIC. The BASIC-80 interpreter was the best, and everyone considered it the standard. Computer manufacturers purchased the rights to put Microsoft's BASIC on their computers. Apple, Commodore, and even IBM.

With the introduction of the PC, Microsoft became not only a supplier of languages but a supplier of operating systems. Shortly thereafter, Microsoft offered application software: the first version of Word and a spreadsheet called Multiplan.

Microsoft was successful. Too successful, one might argue. MS-DOS become the dominant operating system, overpowering CP/M-86, the UCSD p-System, and even Microsoft's Xenix. When PC hardware was capable of supporting graphic environments, Microsoft introduced Windows and out-performed Atari GEM, Desqview, and even IBM's OS/2.

Microsoft's success was not limited to operating systems. The Windows versions of Word and Excel (the replacement for Multiplan) drove out the popular packages Wordstar, Wordperfect, Lotus 1-2-3, and Quattro Pro.

By the year 2000, Microsoft held dominance in a number of markets:

Operating systems The licensing arrangements with PC manufacturers ensured the dominance of PC-DOS and Windows. (The licenses demanded royalties for every PC shipped, with or without Windows.)

Networking software Microsoft bundled network software into Windows, destroying the market for add-on products like Novell Netware.

Office applications Microsoft had Word, Excel, and Powerpoint. Microsoft products stored files in proprietary, hard-to-decode formats. Their products were good at importing documents from other vendors but not so good at exporting them.

Later, Microsoft introduced Outlook for e-mail and scheduling.

Language compilers and IDEs Visual Studio was the dominant package. Competitors Borland and Symantec exited the business. Even smaller vendors such as Nu-mega and Rogue Wave left the field.

Microsoft's efforts did not end there.

Web browser Microsoft fought off the threat from Netscape and made Internet Explorer the dominant browser.

Database Microsoft introduced MS-Access as a low-end database (and purchased Foxpro) and later introduced SQL Server for the high end. (Competition at that level remains, with IBM's DB2 and Oracle's offerings.)

Project Management Microsoft introduced Project and took the market from Harvard Project Manager.

The problem for Microsoft, as I see it, is that Microsoft overfished their ecosystem. Their platform business was successful. Their application business was successful. But those successes came at the cost of the developers of large products. With Microsoft's ability to move into any market, few wanted to develop large applications or solutions. Why spend the time and effort when success will draw the attention of the big M?

I think that it is no coincidence that the new "big apps" of Facebook and Twitter took root in the web, away from Microsoft's empire of Windows.

I also think that the "overfishing of the Microsoft ecosystem" lead to the rise of Apple. I see several factors:

People were angry with Microsoft. They were tired of losing the battle. Not just vendors, but users. We users were tired of committing to a non-Microsoft product, implementing it, learning it, and adapting it to our business, only to find that Microsoft would roll out a competing product and take over the market (forcing us to change to the Microsoft product). Enough force migrations leads to resentment.

Microsoft become complacent. They became used to the idea of the Microsoft empire, and did not see a need to compete. Microsoft let Visual SourceSafe languish for years, and developed the successor product (TFS) only after a number of vendors started introducing new technologies and capturing market share.

Microsoft chose conservative, selfish visions of the future They enhanced products with features but not benefits for users. Windows Vista looked pretty, but offered little in the way of direct business benefits. The Microsoft Office "ribbon" interface provided questionable benefit at a high cost. New versions of Visual Studio offered modest improvements. The "advances" offered by Microsoft were designed to benefit Microsoft more than the customer.

Now, Microsoft has the challenge of re-vitalizing their ecosystem. Can they woo back developers (and companies) for the new Windows Store? After years of abuse, will people want to play in the Microsoft space?

Oddly enough, I think that the answer is "yes". I think that a lot of developers are wary of Apple and unsure of Google and Android. I think Microsoft can be successful with its new platform.

But they will have to play nicely with others.

Windows RT drops some tech, and it hurts

Say what you will about Microsoft's innovation, licenses, or product quality, but one must admit that Microsoft has been quite good at supporting products and providing graceful upgrades. Just about every application that ran on Windows 3.1 will run on later versions of Windows, and most DOS programs will run in the "Command Prompt" application. Microsoft has provided continuity for applications.

The introduction of Windows RT breaks that pattern. With this new version of Windows, Microsoft has deliberately selected technologies into "keep" and "discard" piles -- and it has done so without even a "deprecated" phase, to give people some time to adjust.

The technologies in the "discard" pile are not insignificant. The biggest technology may be Silverlight, Microsoft's answer to Adobe's Flash. It is allowed in Windows 8 but not in Windows RT.

Such a loss is not unprecedented in the Microsoft community, but it is infrequent. Previous losses have included things like Microsoft Bob and Visual J#, but these were minor products and never gained much popularity.

The most significant losses may have been FoxPro and the pre-.NET version of Visual Basic. These were popular products and the replacements (Microsoft Access and VB.NET) were significantly different.

The loss of technologies hurts. We become attached to our favorite tech, whether it be Silverlight, Visual Basic, or earlier technologies such as Microsoft's BASIC interpreter (the one with line numbers), the 6502 processor, or DEC's PDP-11 systems.

Microsoft fans (with the exception of the FoxPro and Visual Basic enthusiasts) have not experienced a loss. Until Windows RT. Microsoft's strong support for backwards-compatibility in its operating systems, languages, and applications has sheltered its users.

Those of us from certain graduating classes, those of us who were around before the introduction of the IBM PC, have experienced loss. Just about everyone from those classes lost their favorite tech as the "new kid" of the IBM PC became popular, set standards, and drove out the other designs. The Apple II, the TRS-80, the Commodore systems, (and my favorite, the Heathkit H-89) were all lost to us. We had formed our loyalties and had to cope with the market-driven choices of new technology.

Folks who joined the tech world after the IBM PC have experienced no such loss. One may have started with PC-DOS and followed a chain of improved versions of DOS to Windows 3.1 to Windows NT to Windows XP, and a chain of upgrades for Word, Multiplan to Excel, and Access to SQL Server.

Windows RT marks the beginning of a new era, one in which Microsoft drops the emphasis on backwards-compatibility. The new emphasis will be on profitability, on selling Surface units and (more importantly) apps and content for Windows RT tablets.

To the Windows developers and users: I'm sorry for your loss, but I have gone through such losses and I can tell you that you will survive. It may seem like a betrayal -- and it is. But these betrayals happen in the tech world; companies make decisions on profit, not your happiness.

Unexpected success

George Lucas is know for the "Star Wars" movies, some of the most successful movies of all time.

Yet I suspect it started differently.

In 1977, Lucas had the movies "THX-1138" and "American Graffiti" behind him. "THX-1138" is an obscure movie, now most famous for being one of Lucas' creations. It is a decent movie, and respected by science fiction fans, but not known outside of fandom. "American Graffiti" was a successful movie: popular in its day but now more of a fond memory. (When was the last time you watched it?) There is nothing in either movie that says "genius movie maker".

I suspect that George Lucas made "Star Wars" and was hoping for a reasonable amount of success, and that he was not expecting the movie to become the foundation of a franchise and marketing empire.

I believe that Apple, with the first iPhone, was, like George Lucas, hoping for a reasonable amount of success. I also believe that the tremendous response far surpassed Apple's expectations. (I suspect it also surpassed AT&T's expectations, which conveniently explains the difficulties encountered by so many new iPhone customers when they activated their accounts.)

Their successes were due, in part, to the gambles that each made. Lucas used computers to control the models of X-wing fighters, selected classical music, and released in the summer. Apple created an elegant design quite different from contemporary cell phones, leveraged its "easy to install" ideas for apps from Mac OSX, and built an interface that was different from the traditional Windows (and even Mac) OS.

Lucas' work stamped itself onto our culture, with "The Force" and even the quote "I've got a bad feeling about this".

Apple's work changed the course of the industry, such that Microsoft Windows and the "windows, icons, mouse, and pointer" theme is no longer the design leader. Microsoft's introduction of Windows RT and the "Modern" UI shows the effect of the iPhone success.

All of which perhaps is evidence that success is something that cannot be planned, timed, or scheduled, and that success can come from taking risks and ignoring established ideas.

Microsoft is serious about WinRT

The month of August taught us one thing: Microsoft is serious about WinRT and the new Win 8 UI.

I suspect that most Windows developers were secretly hoping that the Windows 8 UI (formerly known as "Metro") were a grand joke, a big bluff by Microsoft. But the release of Windows 8, complete with UI-makeover, has shown that Microsoft was not bluffing. Microsoft is serious about this Windows 8 thing.

The new Windows 8 UI is quite a departure from "good old Windows". It is a bigger change than the change from Windows 3 to Windows 95. Windows 8 introduces "tiles" (bigger and better app icons), swipes, taps, mouseless operation, and even keyboardless operation.

The changes in Windows 8 are not limited to the UI. Windows 8, in its "RT" flavor, boasts a new API, a smaller and more focussed API that breaks many current programs. (Programs that use the "classic" Windows API are permitted to run under "Windows desktop" mode on full-blown Windows 8, but cannot run under the more limited Windows 8 RT environment.

Worst of all, Windows 8 (in the new UI) eliminates the "Start" button. This change, I think, surpasses all others in terms of shock value. People will tolerate new APIs and new tiles, but they know and love their Start button.

But Microsoft is serious about these changes, and -- perhaps more shocking than anything Microsoft has done -- I agree with them.

Microsoft has to move into the tablet space. They have to move into mobile/cloud computing. The reason is simple: mobile/cloud is where the growth is.

The Windows platform (the classic Windows desktop platform) has become stagnant. Think about it: When was the last time that you purchased a new Windows application? I'm not talking about upgrades to Microsoft Office or Adobe Acrobat, but a purchase of a new application, one that you have not been using the past? If you're like me, the answer is: a long time ago. I have been maintaining a Windows platform and set of applications, but not expanding it.

The Windows platform (the classic desktop platform) has achieved its potential, and has nowhere to grow. The web took away a lot of the growth of Windows applications (why buy or create a Windows-only app when I can buy or create a web app?) and the mobile/cloud world is taking away the rest of Windows desktop potential. (It's also taking away the rest of Mac OSX potential and Linux desktop potential. The web and mobile/cloud are equal-opportunity paradigm shifts.)

Microsoft recognizes this change, and they are adapting. With Windows 8, they have created a path forward for their developers and customers. This path is different from previous Windows upgrades, in that Windows 8 does not guarantee to run all previous applications. (At least the Windows 8 RT path does not -- it has the reduced API that restricts apps to a limited set of operations.)

Windows 8 RT is a big "reset" for the Microsoft development community. It introduces a new API and a new toolset (Javascript and HTML5). It discards a number of older technologies (a big departure from Microsoft's previous policy of maintaining backwards-compatibility). It forces developers to the new tools and API, and knocks lots of experienced developers down to the junior level. In effect, it sets all developers on the same "starting line" and starts a new race.

But the tablet and mobile/cloud worlds are the worlds of growth. Microsoft has to move there. They cannot ignore it, nor can they move there in gentle, easy steps. Apple is there today. Google is there today. Amazon.com is there today. Microsoft must move there today, and must force its developers there today.

I see this move as a good thing for Microsoft. It will cause a lot of change (and a lot of pain) but it keeps them competitive.