Overfishing your ecosystem

Vendors must execute their business carefully. Is the business providing a platform for others? A turn-key system? A multi-platform application? Doing one of these things well is difficult. Doing all of them well is much harder. It is easy to grow one sector at the expense of another.

Microsoft fell into this trap.

Early in its history, Microsoft was the provider of BASIC. The BASIC-80 interpreter was the best, and everyone considered it the standard. Computer manufacturers purchased the rights to put Microsoft's BASIC on their computers. Apple, Commodore, and even IBM.

With the introduction of the PC, Microsoft became not only a supplier of languages but a supplier of operating systems. Shortly thereafter, Microsoft offered application software: the first version of Word and a spreadsheet called Multiplan.

Microsoft was successful. Too successful, one might argue. MS-DOS become the dominant operating system, overpowering CP/M-86, the UCSD p-System, and even Microsoft's Xenix. When PC hardware was capable of supporting graphic environments, Microsoft introduced Windows and out-performed Atari GEM, Desqview, and even IBM's OS/2.

Microsoft's success was not limited to operating systems. The Windows versions of Word and Excel (the replacement for Multiplan) drove out the popular packages Wordstar, Wordperfect, Lotus 1-2-3, and Quattro Pro.

By the year 2000, Microsoft held dominance in a number of markets:

Operating systems The licensing arrangements with PC manufacturers ensured the dominance of PC-DOS and Windows. (The licenses demanded royalties for every PC shipped, with or without Windows.)

Networking software Microsoft bundled network software into Windows, destroying the market for add-on products like Novell Netware.

Office applications Microsoft had Word, Excel, and Powerpoint. Microsoft products stored files in proprietary, hard-to-decode formats. Their products were good at importing documents from other vendors but not so good at exporting them.

Later, Microsoft introduced Outlook for e-mail and scheduling.

Language compilers and IDEs Visual Studio was the dominant package. Competitors Borland and Symantec exited the business. Even smaller vendors such as Nu-mega and Rogue Wave left the field.

Microsoft's efforts did not end there.

Web browser Microsoft fought off the threat from Netscape and made Internet Explorer the dominant browser.

Database Microsoft introduced MS-Access as a low-end database (and purchased Foxpro) and later introduced SQL Server for the high end. (Competition at that level remains, with IBM's DB2 and Oracle's offerings.)

Project Management Microsoft introduced Project and took the market from Harvard Project Manager.

The problem for Microsoft, as I see it, is that Microsoft overfished their ecosystem. Their platform business was successful. Their application business was successful. But those successes came at the cost of the developers of large products. With Microsoft's ability to move into any market, few wanted to develop large applications or solutions. Why spend the time and effort when success will draw the attention of the big M?

I think that it is no coincidence that the new "big apps" of Facebook and Twitter took root in the web, away from Microsoft's empire of Windows.

I also think that the "overfishing of the Microsoft ecosystem" lead to the rise of Apple. I see several factors:

People were angry with Microsoft. They were tired of losing the battle. Not just vendors, but users. We users were tired of committing to a non-Microsoft product, implementing it, learning it, and adapting it to our business, only to find that Microsoft would roll out a competing product and take over the market (forcing us to change to the Microsoft product). Enough force migrations leads to resentment.

Microsoft become complacent. They became used to the idea of the Microsoft empire, and did not see a need to compete. Microsoft let Visual SourceSafe languish for years, and developed the successor product (TFS) only after a number of vendors started introducing new technologies and capturing market share.

Microsoft chose conservative, selfish visions of the future They enhanced products with features but not benefits for users. Windows Vista looked pretty, but offered little in the way of direct business benefits. The Microsoft Office "ribbon" interface provided questionable benefit at a high cost. New versions of Visual Studio offered modest improvements. The "advances" offered by Microsoft were designed to benefit Microsoft more than the customer.

Now, Microsoft has the challenge of re-vitalizing their ecosystem. Can they woo back developers (and companies) for the new Windows Store? After years of abuse, will people want to play in the Microsoft space?

Oddly enough, I think that the answer is "yes". I think that a lot of developers are wary of Apple and unsure of Google and Android. I think Microsoft can be successful with its new platform.

But they will have to play nicely with others.