Why the Microsoft tablet for Windows 8 is significant

This past week Microsoft  announced a tablet for Windows 8.

Microsoft has a checkered history of hardware. Their successful devices include the Kinect, the XBOX, the "melted" keyboard, and the Microsoft Mouse. Failures include the Zune and the Kin, and possibly the Surface. Many people want to know: will the tablet be a success or a failure?

This is the wrong question.

Microsoft had to release a tablet. The market is changing, and the rules of the new market dictate that vendors provide hardware and software.

Microsoft must succeed with the tablet. Perhaps not this particular tablet, but they must succeed with *a* tablet, and probably several tablets.

The old PC market had a model that separated hardware, operating systems, and applications. Various vendors built PCs, Microsoft supplied the operating system, and multiple (non-hardware) vendors supplied application programs. In the early days, one purchased an IBM PC and PC-DOS (supplied to IBM by Microsoft), and Lotus 1-2-3 and WordPerfect. Once manufacturers figured out ways of (legally) building PC clones, one could buy a PC made by IBM, or Compaq, or Dell, or a host of other companies, but the operating system was supplied by Microsoft.

People who are knowledgeable of the history of computing will recognize that the separation of hardware and software originates in an anti-trust lawsuit against IBM, for mainframe software of all things. Yet that decision influenced the marketing arrangements for the original IBM PC, and those arrangements (software separate from hardware) influenced the entire PC market. (To be fair, the pre-IBM PC market had similar arrangements: Radio Shack TRS-80 computers, Apple II computers, and others let you add software -- any compatible software -- to the computer.)

That model endures with today's desktop and laptop PCs. We buy the PC, an operating system (usually Windows) is included, and we add our separately-acquired software. That software may come from any source, be it another company or our internal development shop. We are responsible for configuration and upkeep, and for problems due to incompatible software.

Apple, with the iPhone and iPad, uses a different model: they supply the hardware and the operating system, and while other vendors supply the applications, Apple limits the freedom of users to select application providers. With iTunes, only those apps approved by Apple can get onto an iPhone or iPad. Users cannot select any application, or any provider, or even have them custom-written. They must go through iTunes (and therefore Apple).

The phrase for this arrangement is "walled garden". The environment is a pretty place, but one cannot leave easily. The vendor has erected a wall around the garden, and occupants must remain within the constructed garden.

Walled gardens, especially in tech, have a downside. When leaving one garden for another, one often loses content. You can buy a dozen books for your Kindle. Buy a replacement Kindle and your books are available. Buy instead a Nook, and your books are not available. Barnes and Noble knows nothing about your purchases with Amazon.com, and Amazon.com has no incentive to make it easy (or even possible) to transfer your purchases to another device. While we can leave the garden, we do so only by  leaving things behind.

This walled garden model is used by game consoles. Games are made specific to consoles; the XBOX version of "Diablo 3" will run only on XBOX systems, not on Playstations. If you purchased an XBOX and lots of games, and then you decide to switch to the Playstation console, you don't get all the games available in their Playstation form.

We are entering an age of walled gardens. Apple has their iPhone/iPad garden, Amazon.com has theirs, Barnes and Noble is building theirs. With the introduction of the Microsoft tablet, we can see that Microsoft is building theirs. Google has built some infrastructure with Google Docs and the Chromebook laptop/browser.

This new age of walled gardens, of separate kingdoms, requires developers, users, and companies to make choices.

Developers must select the platforms to support. They can focus their efforts onto a limited number of platforms, or they can develop for all of them. But development for each platform requires tools, skills, and time. A large company can invest in multi-platform efforts; a small company with limited resources must choose a subset, possibly forgoing revenue from the omitted market segment.

Users must select their platforms carefully. The cost of changing is high, much higher than changing from a Dell PC to an Asus PC, or changing from a Ford to a Chevy.

Companies must select their platform. They have done so in the past, usually picking Microsoft, the safe choice. (How many times have you heard the phrase "we're a Microsoft shop"?) But now the choice is riskier; there is no safe choice, no one dominant provider (and no one provider that appears ready to become dominant). A company's success will depend not only on its talent and ability to execute business plans, but also upon the success of its platform. A company may do well in its market, yet fail when its technology provider fails.

These are difficult decisions, and they must be made. One cannot defer the selection of platforms; others in the world are moving to new platforms.

To wait is to be left behind.